Joseph Stalin and First Five-Year Plan Essay

AbstractThe historical scope of this enquiry essay foc maps on the methods under come uponn by Joseph Stalin in industrializing the Soviet marriage through his starting judgment of conviction pes Five-Year think. Thus, the main oral sex arising throughout this essay is the following To What bound Were Joseph Stalins Methods In Employing The commencement exercise Five-Year Plan (1928-1932) Effective In Achieving His trus tworthy industrial Aims? In fellowship to be able to analyze much(prenominal) controversial topic, the essay initial addresses how Stalin show uped the idea for stinting harvest-home, mainly by employing three methods telephone exchangeized, directive throwning, function of political propaganda campaigns, and a focus on clayey manu particularuring. The precedes of industrialisation be then study and comp ared to the receivedly proposed objectives. Much of the research conducted was found on primary sources of evidence as well as secondary sour ces that intimately accurately depicted the situation of the Soviet compact at the time and its progress through the specified time decimal come in of the Stalin politics.Analysis of much(prenominal) documents was likewise required in order to correctly deduce the likelyness and validity of the evidence presented in order to be able to base the stopping points on the information. Lastly, the use of historians interpretations was utilize in order to substantiate claims or provide helpful alternative viewpoints. This research essay and so cogitate that, although he did managed to expand enormously enthronization funds in manufacture and advertize the nation out of its cacuminal, agrarian deposit, Stalin did non attain comprehensive industrial enterprise for the Soviet sum total. Essentially, the deep bureaucratization of the thrift, in concert with the particular features of the Soviet form _or_ organization of government, produced a combining of contradictor y forces originating from bureaucratic self-interests and impulsive political forget.This would prevent the outlet of the proper(ip) mix of factors that would assure the normal functioning of the deliverance. submit of limitAbstract 2 Abbreviations and colour 4 Introduction - 5 Stalins Realization for industrialisation1. Explaining the Five-Year Plan (1928 1932) -7 Analysis of Soviet Model of Industrialization under Stalin1. Stalin and Centralized Directive provision 9 2. Stalin and Political Propaganda Campaigns - 10 3. Stalin and Focus on Heavy Industry - 13 Results of eldest Five-Year Plan1. Development of Overall Industrial Sector -10 Conclusion -17 Notes - Bibliography 19Abbreviations and Glossary1.2. Central commissioning Soviet communist companionship supreme body, elective atParty Congress.3. Gosbank Gosudarstvenny bank SSSR (USSR State Bank) Soviet Union central bank and the simply bank in the entire USSR from the 1930s until 1987.4. Gos picture Gosudarstv enniy Komitet po Planirovaniyu (State Planning Committee) committee responsible for stinting be afterward in the Soviet Union. One of its main duties was the creation of Five-Year Plans.5. Gossnab State Supplies of the USSR the state committee for clobber technical supply in the Soviet Union. Primarily responsible for the apportioning of producer solids to enterprises, a overdecisive state function in the absence seizure of chumpets.6. Gulag Glavnoe Upravlenie Lagerei (main camp administration) eventually in charge of Soviet concentration camps.7. Mensheviks minority faction of the RSDLP, founded in 19038. NEP New Economic Policy (1921-1929) introduced by Lenin.9. Pravda the official impertinentlyspaper of the Communist PartyIntroductionIn October 1928, Joseph Stalin(1) executed the initial Five-Year Plan (piatiletka) in order to strengthen the economy of the Soviet Union and accelerate its rate of industrialization. Part of a series of nationwide, centralized exercises in fast frugal development, the branch Five-Year Plan would become the basis for futurity overall industrial occupation and development of life-threatening industries (manufacturing and armed forces goods).(A) Since the conclusion of the prime(prenominal) Five-Year Plan, however, numerous accounts exact sur saluted either praising or criticizing Stalins perplex of economic growth (depending on the interpreters gustatory modality of results) in relation to the Soviet Unions future development. Although recent historians, including Evan Mawdsley(2) and Robert Gellately(3), debate over the extent of Stalins success in achieving the original aims of the First Five-Year Plan, the studyity of them will agree that he did run a signifi dopet and essential increase in industrial growth that would ultimately elevate the Soviet Union as a knowledge base elucidate top executive.(E) Nevertheless, callable to the unreliability of primary resources originating from Soviet a rchives and recurring debates among historians, more or less difficulties continue to exist in accurately defining the extent of Stalins success and whether his methods were applicable in employing the First Five-Year Plan virtually effectively. Advocates of Marxism-Leninism introduce that the tyrannical and abrasive methodology in achieving major industrialization was the more or less appropriate and necessary in both the economic and social modernization of the USSR as well as indispensable for its survival in the face of capitalist enemies. However, Non-Soviet Marxists, from Mensheviks to Herbert Marcuse(4), criticize this approach for its long-term detrimental effects on the economy and working class, as well as the profound mark on the Soviet cultural life and standard of living.(F) Therefore, a critical examination of the diverse range of historical interpretations and analyses concerning this controversial subject should thus be conducted, making the topic of Soviet in dustrialization worthy of investigation.This research paper, in spite of the limited availability of Soviet primary sources and their enigmatic credibility, will thus attempt to answer the following question To What Extent Were Joseph Stalins Methods In Employing The First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932) Effective In Achieving His Original Industrial Aims? In this focus, valuable insight into historians methods in incorporating evidence to actualize their claims and constructing their causes based on such evidence will be murdered. In order to maintain clarity and focus, this research paper will fundamentally discuss industrialization and will thus revolve around two themes First, the Soviet model of industrial advancement was non comprehensive and its achievements can only by attributed and limited to definite sectors. Second, the methods employed by Stalin to achieve industrialization and economic modernization were patch upible and precluded complete achievement of the propos ed goals.Stalins Realization for IndustrializationExplaining the First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932)It is important to first gain an understanding of what Josef Stalins First Five-Year Plan entailed and what he aimed to accomplish in the industrial sectors by the end of the five year period. The latter approach will enable a qualified analysis examining how the results of the forge compared to the in the beginning evinceed objectives, thus, providing the necessary perspective in evaluating Stalins methods for economic reformation. In October 1928, Stalin incorporated the Soviet blueprint for the institution of socialism in the First Five-Year Plan, representing the first attempt by a major superpower to interpret all aspects of economy and society. This new Soviet strategy focus primarily on establishing a thick industrial sector to expedite the growth of manufactured products and armaments as well as reconstructing the agricultural sector on a new technical foundation.(G) Thi s would create a self-dependent USSR in call of war machine and industry and, more importantly, propagate the leftic doctrines throughout the nation.Overall, the plan would mainly touch on the industrial and agricultural sectors, but it was also grade to transform the social and cultural aspects of the Soviet populace. The aims were to surpass capitalisms per capita outfit to pretend greater technological advancements employ a stalk transformation of agriculture through the employment of machinery and modern techniques to give precedency to heavy industry, rather than consumer goods produce the infrastructure of a modern, efficient state raise the standard of living, providing mint access to better education, wellness care, and offbeat and to secure the unpolished against foreign beleaguerrs.(H) However, this research essay will finalize the scope of Stalins Five-Year Plan objectives by focus on the industrial aspects of the plan. Quantitatively, in harm of industry , the projected growth for overall industrial production was to increase by 250% and heavy industry by 330%.(I) The extent to which this economic feat of modernization was plausible was a matter often discussed and repugn inside the Communist Party.Sergo Ordzhonikidze, the commissar of heavy industry, admitted the challenge to be redoubtable considering the agrarian, industrially-backward state of the USSR. Stalin himself admitted in his 1933 speech on the results of the First Five-Year Plan that the reappearance and development of heavy industry, specially in such a backward and poor country as USSR was at the beginning of the five-year plan period, was an exceedingly difficult task.(K) Their justification in making such statements probably was that heavy industry requires both the enormous financial expenditure and the existence of experient technical forces (both of which the Soviets could not afford or did not have), without which, generally speaking, the restitution o f heavy industry is impossible. Certainly, with Stalins steep demand in industrial development, the Five-Year Plan appeared barely achievable. historiographer Evan Mawdsley correctly points out how the two major policies stipulated in the plan were extremely demanding and in the long run turn up to be unattainable. It is probable he based such observation on several factors including unavailable seed capital because of international reaction to Communist policies, little international trade, and virtually no modern infrastructure. Essentially, Stalins propose of the First Five-Year Plan seemed unviable and unsustainable, but it is for this same reason that it is necessary to value how Stalin achieved his goals and to what extent.Analyzing the Soviet Model of Industrialization under Stalin Stalin and Centralized Directive PlanningPerhaps one of the clearest distinctions in Stalins methods of Soviet industrialization was that it was not based on private enterprise, but that it was totally state-driven and was largely based on centralized directive think.(J) Most effective, argues Evan Mawdsley, was the schema of economic administration that was based on the party leadership, Gosplan, the ministerial system, the commissariat of heavy industry (Narkomtiazhprom), and the supervisory role of the Central Committee. In contrast to Lenins NEP, the First Five-Year Plan represented this new systems movement towards establishing central planning as the basis of economic decision-making and the stress on rapid heavy industrialization.This economic mechanism displayed particular strengths at periods when the political objectives of the political science demanded a rapid breakthrough in some branches of the national economy or during the emergency of war. However, Evan Mawdsley further argues against different historians that referring to the Soviet economy as a be after economy would be misleading, especially for the initial period of Soviet industrialization.(M) Fir st of all, Stalinist planning did not make for the balance growth of industry, or consider investment rates versus consumption rates. Historian Andy Blunden makes a similar argument in which he proposes that the Stalin economic model of development was not based on the Marxist concept of planned economy, but rather (to some extent) on a bureaucratic centralist-command economy.(N) combination both historical interpretations, it thus follows to infer that what the system did provide was a means of rigid prioritization, concentrating production in key areas of the Soviet economy (heavy industry), but at the same time limiting the blowup and diversification of the economic sector as a result of stringent political issues.Thus, Alex Chubarov, a professor at Coventry University in England, makes a rather true statement about the overly centralized planning system in the Soviet Union It did not always work in practice. Stalins policies to tighten work discipline often worsened econo mic output instead of promoting production. Because of the stringent political climate that permitted few people to provide negative input or criticize the plan, Soviet planners had very(prenominal) little reliable feedback which they could use to determine the success of their plans.(O) Thus, economic planning was often done based on faulty or overaged information, especially in sectors with a large clientele. As a result, certain goods, especially consumer goods, tended to be underproduced, leading to shortages, while some goods such as manufactured goods, armaments, etc. were overproduced and put in storage. Furthermore, factories took to inflating their production figures due to the ascetical punishment of failure and the poor quality of products inhibited their use.(P) Stalin and Political Propaganda CampaignsThe nigh important distinction was that Stalins industrialization was greatly politicized. Industrialization as a process usually accompanies the movement towards mode rnization in each country. However, in the Soviet Union, the achievement of industrialization was greatly a result of political influences, mainly the power of carefully stage-managed propaganda campaigns. These political campaigns ultimately focused on socialist industrialization as the essential and indispensable flavour in building the material foundations of socialism, a theme eer used by Stalin in several of his public appearances. The Stalinist political politics and the inflation of ideological principles for the rapid economic growth to prevent rub in the global competition would thus prove to be mayhap one of the most necessary components of the economic success. During the late 1920s, the need for rapid industrialization arose from the question of whether Soviet Russia could provide the needs to support socialism in a country that was industrially underdeveloped and agriculturally backward. Thus, as reiterated constantly by Stalin in his public speeches, socialist industrialization was the key divisor in instituting the material basis for socialism in the Soviet Union as well as ensuring its success. In November 19, 1928, Stalin delivered a speech monition the populace about the vulnerability of socialism to the capitalist nations, and the survival of the political orientation through industrial fronts Soviets have pass offn and outstripped the advanced capitalist countries by establishing a new political system. That is good. But that is not enough.To secure the final triumph of Socialism in our country, we must also buy the farm and outstrip these countries technically and economically. If we do not do this, we shall find ourselves forced to the wall. (B) In this choice from his 1928 speech, Stalin instilled fear in the population about imminent attacks from the capitalists if the USSR did not overtake and outstrip the Western nations through technical and economic means. However, this method of transport war panic through the manip ulation of the catch up and overtake (dognat i peregnat) theme was used as justification to dissolve Lenins New Economic Policy and attain populist appeal to take aim major industrialization. Robert Gellately, the Earl Ray Beck Professor of business relationship at Florida State University, argues that Stalin high-sounding a war scare inspired by Anglo-French imperialism that came up in 1927, one he deliberately exaggerated to drive home the point that the USSR was vulnerable to the hostile West.(N) He denotes how Stalin used the elimination of diplomatic relations by Britain in May and the presence of political friction with France, Poland, Romania to the westbound and Japan to the east accordingly in his demand to industrialize the country as rapidly as possible, to focus on heavy industry, and to trim the NEP in favor of a more Communistic five-year plan. (D) Based on Gellatelys observation, it would follow that Stalin could then make the argument that it was crucial to the health and security of the Soviets that the Party take this change of course, facilitating popular support for the Five-Year Plan. (C) Stalin was not the only communist to take the threat seriously, and the crisis had an important influence on the decision to industrialize. But of those nations, Romania was the only threat to ever develop. More important, however, was a subsequent war scare in his speech to industrial managers on February 1931 (during the height of the enthusiasm for the Five-Year Plan), when Stalin proclaimed To reduce the tempo, means to fall behind. Those who fall behind get beatenWe are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall be crushed. (C) Ten years later, in 1941, Adolf Hitler commences military mobilization for Operation Barbarossa to invade the Soviet Union.But to see the German onslaught as good justification for Stalins rapid industrialization solely from the perspective of the 1941 invasion would be misleading. During 1931, Germany was suffering deep economic turmoil from the Great belief and Hitler was still a fringe politician, so it was no rattling risk of exposure to the USSR. Germanys army had also been limited to 100,000 soldiers, without tanks or aircraft. Historian Mawdsley also identifies the clear up propaganda machine, coupled with upward mobility and popular nationalism at critical periods, as successful in winning support for the program of industrialization.(M) However, different Gellately, he proposes that the acceleration of industrialization as a result of tentative attacks may have been justified. Industrialization came from the Soviets general mistrust of the outside world which, in turn, had root both in the Russian tradition and in the Communists perception of the outside world. Russias rulers had promoted industry for military opposition and defense force as well as to assure the countrys power status. In pa rt, Stalin and the Communist Party proselytized the ideology of capitalist encirclement and the real memories of invasion from European powers and Japan during World War I and the Russian Civil War. Stalins Method and Heavy IndustryFinally, the doctrine of socialist industrialization put great emphasis on massive expanding upon of heavy industry, particularly the means of production, as a necessary first step on the way to the technological restructuring of the entire economy. Only after a massive surge in heavy industrial talent had been achieved would it be possible to embark on a more equilibrize economic strategy, including the development of consumer-oriented light industry. As a result of a whole procedure of factors, the Soviet industrialization would be confined, for the most part, to the colorful priority development of heavy industry. Aside from receiving special attention from the planning the economic system of administration, industrial production was relativel y easy to plan even without minute feedback, which led to significant growth in that sector. Consequently, industrial production was dis symmetricalnessately higher in the Soviet Union than in Western economies, with production of consumer goods also being proportionately higher.However, one of the most eminent Marxist scholars in the world of economics, Maurice Dobbs, points out the problems of Soviet economic planning and explains the fallible economic logic behind the Soviet way of industrialization with investment priority for heavy industries. First of all, the rate of investment or the average savings ratio in an economy will be rather static, largely determined within fairly stipulate limits by past history and past decisions. Therefore, focus should be abandoned to distribution of investment because it may essentially determine the future output and consumption in a major way. Dobbs argues that it may in fact be more important than the overall rate of investment.(Q) Dobbs seems to base his argument on the theory of factor proportions, a doctrine of comparative be in terms of marginal productivity, which states that those factors of production that are relatively wide have a low marginal productivity and hence a low price and conversely with factors that are relatively scarce. Consequently, those forms of production that use relatively more of the abundant factors and economize on the scarce ones would have the lowest expenditures. He argues that in a country like Russia with profuse labor and scarce capital, relatively labor-using techniques are most economical (rather than capital-expensive ones). It is thus more beneficial and appropriate for the applications on handicrafts and light industries rather than heavy industries, where there is a large expenditure of fixed capital (plant and equipment).(R)Results of the First Five-Year PlanDevelopment of Overall Industrial SectorAfter having analyzed Joseph Stalins methods in employing the First Five- Year Plan, it is then necessary tax their impact on the proceeding industrialization results. First of all, by directing and focusing investments on heavy industry and not consumer goods, it was possible to attain industrialization over a relatively short period. The industrialization enabled the Soviet Union to mass-produce aircraft, trucks, cars, tractors, combine harvesters, synthetic rubber, and different types of equipment designed primarily for the expansion of heavy industry and military might. In the years of the great throttle industrial production grew at an average annual rate of 10 to 16 percent, displaying the remarkable dynamism and seemingly boundless potential of the new economic system. Table 1-1 shows the specific advancements made in heavy industries as a result of concentrating in such sector, thus, illustrating Stalins accomplishment of his aforementioned(prenominal) goal of focusing in heavy industry. Table 1-1 Russian Industrial Growth under Stalin. 192 8 1932 Prescribed Target Percentage Increase betrayer Iron (million tons) 3.3 6.2 8.0 87.8%Coal (million tons) 35.4 64.0 68.0 80.8%Steel (million tons) 4.0 5.9 8.3 47.5%Oil (million tons) 11.7 21.4 19.0 82.9%Electricity (mill. kWhs) 5.0 13.4 17.0 168%However, it is important to evaluate these results and compare them with the larger global context. Table 1-1 shows significant growth for heavy industries in the Soviet Union from 1928 to 1932 despite only achieving the prescribed crisscross in one of the five areas of production. Nevertheless, these results were relatively small compared to Western standards and were established at a great homophile cost. Furthermore, reported Soviet heap up output figures were too high, not least by failing to take into account of the rising prices. Thus, Stalins aforementioned methods of industrialization did indeed make advancements in heavy industrial output but did not accomplish his previous goal of the catch up and overtake s logan considering that the Soviet Union still lagged behind Western capitalist nations in terms of economic power. In terms of manufacturing infrastructure and technological advancements, a wide industrial complex and city were constructed at Nizhni Novgorod on the Volga with the help of the capital of Texas Company (a large American firm), which was designed to produce over 100,000 vehicles per year. an some other(prenominal) American companies were also involved in building tractor plants in Kharkov, Stalingrad and Chelyabinsk.Among the other spectacular projects was the construction of the steel complex at Magnitogorsk, a new city built from the ground up. (S) The colossal project of Magnitogorsk was one flowering example of the sixty or more towns created out of nothing during the First Five-Year Plan. Through the accelerated pace of industrialization employed in the Five-Year Plan, the Soviet Union began producing all the machinery and manufacturing plants necessary to supplement heavy industrialization. Major workings holdd the Moscow, Nizhni-Novgorod, and Gorky automobile plants, the Urals and Kramatorsk heavy machinery plants, the Dnieprostroi hydro-electric project, the mammoth steel plants at Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk, and the web of machine shops and chemical plants in the Urals. Entirely new branches of industry were developed, such as aviation, plastics, and synthetic rubber. The plan constituted an important milestone in the process of the socioeconomic transformation of Russia. At the end of the Five-Year Plan in 1932, Stalin declared that the First Five-Year Plan had been achieved ahead of time.However, the extent to which it was achieved was vague and unclear, with newspapers only allowed to report outstanding achievements of the Soviet Union advance toward socialism and local anesthetic state agencies prohibited from publishing any economic data other than the official figures given by Gosplan. Based on the figures in Table 1-1, St alin declared that the Five-Year Plan for industrial development had been fulfilled by 93.7% in only four years, while development for heavy industry was achieved by 108%. But considering the levels of deception and figure inflation, it is hard to determine how accurate these figures are and to what extent the statements of success can be trusted. Certainly, it was not surprising that the plan did not achieve its prescribed goals of 250% projected growth for overall industrial production and 330% projected growth in heavy industry.ConclusionEssentially, the coercive and abrasive methods of industrialization employed by Stalin during his First Five-Year Plan were admittedly successful when viewed from a holistic perspective. However, it cannot be acknowledged that the plan and how it was particularly executed was comprehensive in achieving its originally proposed objectives of economic development and that the methods utilize were completely effective and appropriate for the So viet Union. Overall, this essay explicitly raises the question of exactly what constituted the achievements of the Soviet industrial system as a whole, and whether, in fact, the Stalin model of industrialization was ultimately the most effective firmness based on its particular approach. First of all, there were several consequences of the over-centralization and very high level of state power reflected in the economic policy of the USSR.The planning system established targets emphasizing quantity at the write off of quality, with the particular system of reward and punishment distorting output reports and encouraging storming (last-minute attempts to achieve targets) and hoarding, i.e. waste, of raw materials. This system of economy was responsive to a small number of customers but inherently inflexible for it could not change to rising demands. Furthermore, due to the stringent political climate that drove the command, bureaucratic economy and advance severe output inflation am ong factories, the extent to which the industrialization results are credible is still unknown. Secondly, the incorporation of the Stalinist political regime into the promotion of economic success would prove to be effective yet also damaging. The elaborate propaganda campaigns set out by Stalin and the injection of popular nationalism at critical periods, won popular support for the program of industrialization. Furthermore, there was a particular kind of motivation present in the enthusiastic officials to establish the pace of industrialization.Now, whether such enthusiasm was felt by the Communist Party as much as Stalin is still under question. However, the darker side of the system was that the pace of industrialization could only be accomplished at the human cost and real sacrifices. Lastly, the urban economy was kept static and investment exclusive to heavy industry at the disbursement of consumer-oriented production. Certainly, the prominence of military production in the e conomy can be potentially beneficial, but at the same time imminently harmful. Paul Kennedy would later dampen an analysis of the rise and fall of great powers that applied especially to the Soviet Union in which he warned that iftoo large a proportion of the states resources is diverted from wealth creation and allocated instead to military purposes, then that is likely to lead to a weakening of national power over the longer term. (T) The huge investments in producer-goods industries led to swell shortages of labor, capital, and material in other crucial sectors. Factories did not meet their evaluate targets and would provide quantity at the cost of quality. Instead of producing the projected 2,000 tractors by September 1930, the Stalingrad tractor factory produced only forty-three, which began to fall apart after lxxii hours of operation.Thus, the deep bureaucratization of the economy, in concert with the particular features of the Soviet policy, produced a combination of contradictory forces originating from bureaucratic self-interests and impulsive political will. This would prevent the emergence of the right mix of factors that would assure the normal functioning of the economy. Completely new branches of industry were built and massive manufacturing plants were undertaken, certainly contributing to the notion of the USSR as an acclivitous industrial power. However, this new power was endowed with fallible features the inherent movement to produce harmful imbalances, the blatant ignorance to consumer goods, production of quantity at the expense of quality, ineffective economic administrative system, etc. Essentially, Stalin did not achieve comprehensive industrialization for the USSR, but he did force the nation to advance from its backward, agrarian state and into a momentum towards economic growth and industrial development.Notes1. Joseph Stalin (18 declination 1878 5 exhibit 1953) born Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhughashvili. In office as fami liar Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 3 April 1922 16 October 1952 and Premier of the Soviet Union from 6 May 1941 to 5 March 1953. 2. Evan Mawdsley Professor of International History in the Department of History, University of Glasgow. His previous publications include The Russian Civil War (1983/2008), The Soviet Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev The Central Committee and its Members, 19171991 (with Stephen White, 2000), The Stalin Years The Soviet Union, 19291953 (2003) and Thunder in the East The Nazi-Soviet War, 19411945 (2005). 3. Robert Gellately Newfoundland-born Canadian academician who is one of the leading historians of modern Europe, particularly during World War II and the Cold War era. He is presently Earl Ray Beck Professor of History at Florida State University and was the Bertelsmann Visiting Professor of Twentieth-Century Jewish Politics and